Global food-production and supply stress (from reduced acreage and fertilizer use) will continue to worsen and persist for roughly 9–18 months from April 2022 (i.e., until approximately January–October 2023).
“everything that we predicted. I mean, this is a slow train, a titanic into the iceberg that we're watching right now, and it's going to continue for 9 to 18 months.”
View on YouTube
Explanation
Global food and fertilizer supply stress from the Russia-Ukraine war did persist through 2022 into 2023, with grain and fertilizer prices remaining elevated for well over a year.
Between April 2022 and April 2023, China will use its food stockpile to export calories and, through these deals, will significantly increase its geopolitical leverage and power in food-insecure countries relative to its pre‑2022 position.
“China is going to be one of the very few potential solutions for bridging the calorie gap over the next year. And I have a strong prediction and a strong belief that because of that, China will use it to maximum leverage. And we will see over the next year an incredible amount of leverage and power being accumulated by China because of transactions that they're going to start to enter into to bridge the calorie gap around the world.”
View on YouTube
Explanation
China did increase agricultural trade deals in food-insecure regions during this period, but a dramatic, widely-reported surge in Chinese geopolitical leverage specifically "bridging the calorie gap" is not clearly documented as a defining 2022-2023 story.
As the food crisis develops in the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti) over the ensuing year or so from April 2022, China will step in as a primary food supplier to resolve acute shortages there and, as a result, will gain increased political influence and at least one new or expanded, more permanent military or strategic foothold in the Horn of Africa region.
“I think that, for example, the the food crisis that we're seeing emerge in Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti is going to be resolved by China. And China is going to end up gaining influence, gaining military presence and establishing a more permanent foothold in the Horn of Africa because of the position that they're in, of strength with all these calories.”
View on YouTube
Explanation
China did not emerge as the primary resolver of the Horn of Africa famine/food crisis in 2022-2023; Western and UN humanitarian aid (USAID, WFP) remained the dominant responders, and no major new Chinese military foothold in the Horn of Africa beyond the existing Djibouti base materialized in that window.
Within 6–9 months from April 2022 (i.e., by roughly October 2022–January 2023), it will be broadly recognized in global media and policy circles that China has significantly increased its geopolitical leverage worldwide by using its surplus food reserves during the global food crisis.
“I think this is going to become a macro trend that we're going to wake up to in 6 to 9 months and be like, whoa, what the heck happened? You know, how did China get so much leverage around the world? And it's starting now.”
View on YouTube
The US economy will experience one or two quarters of real GDP contraction starting in late 2022 and/or early 2023, meeting or approaching the technical definition of a recession in that period.
“I think that that we're probably going to have a quarter or two contraction. It's probably going to happen at sort of at the late end of this year, beginning of next year.”
View on YouTube
Explanation
The US did see two consecutive quarters of negative real GDP growth in Q1 and Q2 2022, meeting the technical definition of recession, though NBER never officially called it one.
By the time the then-current Federal Reserve rate-hiking cycle progresses (i.e., likely by end of 2022 or early 2023), the federal funds rate will reach approximately 3.0–3.5%.
“you know you could see rates at three 3.5%. And that's going to impact a lot of stuff.”
View on YouTube
Explanation
The Fed funds rate reached the 3.00-3.25% range by September 2022 and continued to 4.25-4.5% by year-end, consistent with the 3-3.5% prediction being reached.
By the second half of 2022, the US year-over-year CPI inflation rate will decline from its peak earlier in the year because of base effects, but cumulative CPI inflation over the first two years of the Biden administration (January 2021–January 2023) will total roughly 12–13%, and voters will still feel worse off, resulting in widespread negative sentiment toward the Biden administration going into the November 2022 midterm elections.
“the main reason inflation is going to go down in the second half of this year is because inflation is measured on a year over year basis... So as we sort of lap last year's inflation rate, we come up against, you know, you're copying against A 7.8% number last year, so I don't think inflation's going to get any better. We're probably looking at roughly a 12% you know official two year inflation number. So in other words since Biden took over as president you're looking at probably 12 to 13% of total inflation as measured by CPI. And that is why even though the headline number will come down later this year, I don't think the American people are going to feel any better about the situation... there's going to be a lot of negativity going into the November election for this administration.”
View on YouTube
Explanation
Headline CPI did decline in H2 2022 from its June peak of 9.1%, and cumulative two-year inflation under Biden was roughly in the low-teens percentage range, and negative sentiment did contribute to a disappointing midterm environment for Democrats in some respects, but Democrats actually outperformed expectations in the 2022 midterms, avoiding a feared red wave, which cuts against the "lot of negativity" framing.
The US is headed into an economic slowdown with a high probability of entering a technical recession (two consecutive quarters of negative real GDP growth) toward the end of 2022.
“Let me make a prediction right now, if we're we're definitely headed into an economic slowdown. I don't know if it will meet the technical definition of recession, but very high... very high chance, I think, of recession. Like Thomas said towards the end of the year”
View on YouTube
Explanation
The US recorded two consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth in H1 2022, technically meeting the recession definition, aligning with this prediction even though NBER did not formally declare a recession.
If the Russia–Ukraine war is still ongoing and the US enters a recession by late 2022, President Biden’s job approval will fall to levels comparable to or lower than Jimmy Carter’s worst approval ratings (roughly in the low- to mid‑20% range).
“if this war is still going on and we get in a recession, look out below. I think this president will be in Jimmy Carter territory.”
View on YouTube
Explanation
Biden's approval ratings, while weak (mid-to-high 30s to low 40s through 2022), never fell to Jimmy Carter's historic lows (mid-20s), and the US did not enter a formal recession by late 2022.
European economies will enter a significant recession, more severe than that experienced by the US, with this downturn materializing ahead of or around the same time as the US slowdown in late 2022–2023.
“Europe is going to be the canary in the coal mine on all of this, because I think they feel this pretty severely. And I think there's a lot of exhaustion amongst European governments and leaders... they're going to see a pretty meaningful recession, I think. Much more, much more so than we will.”
View on YouTube
Explanation
The Eurozone did enter a more severe energy-driven downturn than the US in late 2022/2023, with Germany in particular experiencing recession in 2023, consistent with Europe being the "canary in the coal mine."