If Israel responds to the Hamas attacks by effectively "leveling" Gaza (a maximal, indiscriminate military response), this will trigger a much wider regional war in the Middle East and could even escalate into a world war.
“but I do think that if the reaction is this, let's call it the Lindsey Graham level, the place reaction, I think that could set off a much wider regional war or even a world war.”
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Explanation
While Israel's military campaign in Gaza was extremely intense and drew significant international criticism, it did not trigger a full world war or a war involving a broad coalition beyond the existing Israel-Hamas/Hezbollah/Iran-proxy dynamic that had already been anticipated.
Israel will not respond to the Hamas attacks with an extreme, indiscriminate "level the place"-type operation against Gaza; its military response will be more restrained than that maximal option.
“I get the sense that they're not going to go that hard.”
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Explanation
Israel's subsequent military campaign in Gaza was in fact extremely intense and destructive by most assessments, involving extensive bombing and a prolonged ground offensive, closer to the 'level the place' characterization than the more restrained response Jason anticipated.
The Hamas attacks and Israel’s response will significantly derail or reverse the recent progress toward normalization between Israel and Arab states achieved via the Abraham Accords.
“I worry that the progress that was made in the Abraham Accords, all the normalization. Station goes off the rails.”
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Explanation
The Gaza war did significantly derail Abraham Accords momentum, notably freezing progress toward a hoped-for Saudi Arabia-Israel normalization deal that had been under active discussion just before October 7, 2023.
In the aftermath of the October 2023 Hamas attacks, governments and other actors in the Middle East and globally will renew and strengthen their commitment to normalization efforts and to pursuing a peace process (e.g., two‑state solution, Abraham Accords–style initiatives) rather than abandoning them.
“I think this is going to renew people's commitment to peace in the region. And I know many, many of the countries over there are really aghast at what happened, and they've been working really hard to try to normalize relations there and create peace and prosperity and commerce... I do think this will Maybe the good people of the world will recommit to trying to resolve this issue and create peace in the region.”
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Explanation
Some diplomatic efforts toward eventual peace and normalization continued in various forms in subsequent years, but the immediate post-October 7 period saw normalization efforts stall and regional tensions rise substantially rather than renewed commitment to rapid peace-building.
No comprehensive or "larger" peace/normalization deal in the Middle East will be achieved until the political status and treatment of the Palestinians is substantively addressed (e.g., via some form of two‑state solution or equivalent resolution).
“I don't think we're going to get to a larger deal in the Middle East. We're not going to resolve all these problems until this long festering problem of the treatment of the Palestinians is is dealt with.”
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Explanation
No comprehensive Middle East peace or normalization deal has been achieved as of 2026 without substantively addressing the Palestinian political status, consistent with this prediction; the core Palestinian issue has remained a persistent obstacle to broader regional deals.
Eliminating Hamas and its influence (rooting it out from Gaza and the broader Palestinian territories) will be a very long-term effort that will take multiple decades, rather than years.
“It's going to take decades. It's going to take decades.”
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Explanation
This is a multi-decade prediction about eliminating Hamas's influence that cannot be evaluated only a few years into the process.
As of late 2023, if an additional major conflict or front opens (beyond Ukraine), the United States will face serious constraints supplying conventional munitions because its ammunition stockpiles are already dangerously low.
“So the US is already dangerously low on ammunition, and that's before we get potentially another war or another front in this larger conversation that's happening.”
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Explanation
US ammunition stockpiles did face real strain from supplying both Ukraine and later Israel, a widely reported concern through 2023-2024, though the US ultimately managed to continue supplying both conflicts without a full depletion crisis materializing.
Following Israel’s declaration of war against Hamas/Gaza in October 2023, there is a significant risk that the conflict will escalate and spiral into a broader regional war involving multiple Middle Eastern countries.
“Well, we're in a situation now where Israel might be on the precipice of, well, they've declared war against Gaza, and this thing could spiral out of control and become a regional war.”
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Explanation
The Israel-Gaza conflict did significantly raise regional war risk in the following years, including direct Israel-Iran missile exchanges in 2024 and a further Israel-Iran war in June 2025, broadly validating this prediction of escalation risk.
If the United States does not reform its defense procurement system (e.g., the current cost‑plus, oligopolistic structure) to dramatically improve efficiency and innovation, it will be unable over the coming years to maintain its global strategic position and reliably support its allies in future conflicts.
“In a world of rising multipolarity where there are other great powers now, in the system where there are going to be more and more global threats. I don't think we have a chance of maintaining our global position and supporting our allies unless we fix this.”
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Explanation
US defense procurement reform remains an ongoing and unresolved policy debate as of the mid-2020s, with only incremental changes made, so it is not possible to cleanly confirm or deny the long-run strategic consequence predicted here.
If the United States does not adopt policies focused on de‑escalating conflicts, it will experience significant difficulty asserting its interests and managing security in an emerging multipolar world over the coming years.
“We're already mired in the Ukraine proxy war. Now Israel is on the brink. We need smarter people and smarter thinking. In Washington, we are no longer the only superpower. We're going to have a really tough time in a multipolar world if we do not look for ways to de-escalate conflict when we can.”
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Explanation
The US continued to navigate an increasingly multipolar world with mixed success at de-escalation through 2024-2026 (e.g., direct Israel-Iran conflict in 2025), making it difficult to cleanly confirm the predicted difficulty absent a counterfactual of what a more de-escalation-focused policy would have achieved.
Given current (October 2023) economic and international conditions and ongoing lawsuits, Donald Trump will win the 2024 U.S. presidential election easily (“waltz into the White House”), despite spending most of the next year tied up in court and being largely unable to campaign in the usual way; voter fatigue with the situation will override these constraints.
“by the way, this rate, the way things are going in this country right now, both economically and internationally, he's going to waltz into the white House. He's going to spend all his time in the next year in, in the courthouses battling all these lawsuits, the lawfare against him. He's not going to be able to campaign. And it won't even matter because people are going to be so done with this.”
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Explanation
Donald Trump did win the 2024 presidential election relatively comfortably despite his ongoing legal battles, consistent with this prediction, though he was not literally unable to campaign as suggested.